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Abstract. We describe the idea of a Science Gateway, an application-
speciﬁc task wrapped as a web service, and some examples of these that
are being implemented on the US TeraGrid cyberinfrastructure. We also
describe HotGrid, a means of providing simple, immediate access to the
Grid through one of these gateways, which we hope will broaden the
use of the Grid, drawing in a wide community of users. The secondary
purpose of HotGrid is to acclimate a science community to the concepts
of certiﬁcate use. Our system provides these weakly authenticated users
with immediate power to use the Grid resources for science, but without
the dangerous power of running arbitrary code. We describe the imple-
mentation of these Science Gateways with the Clarens secure web server.
1 Science Gateways
For many scientists, the Grid is perceived as diﬃcult to use. There are several
reasons for this: accounts are issued in response to a proposal, which may take
weeks to review. Security concerns often mean that users cannot use passwords,
but rather public-key or certiﬁcate systems that have steep learning curves.
Users are then faced with just a Unix prompt, which many scientists ﬁnd daunt-
ing. Other challenges include diﬃcult porting of code, arcane archival storage
paradigms, the need to learn Globus, Condor, GridFTP, and so on. In return
for this diﬃculty is the promise of access to great computational power, but
this only for a small number of dedicated people who understand both Grid and
science.
Conscious of these diﬃculties, we have devised the HotGrid concept reported
on in this paper, which makes domain-speciﬁc ease of use the driving factor. We
believe that the balanced, pragmatic approach outlined will not only provide
useful science gateways in the medium to long term, but also strong scientiﬁc
results in the short term. We will explore the construction of “science gateways”
which abstract the architectural complexity of Grid resources and scientiﬁc ap-
plications implemented on the Grid, presenting their capabilities to communities
(“Virtual Organizations”) of possibly anonymous scientists, who need no explicit
knowledge of the Grid. This approach to science gateways will provide a grad-
uated and documented path for scientists, from anonymous user, to the weakly
authenticated HotGrid user, through to the power user already comfortable with
the Grid.
Typically, a gateway developer is a scientist who wishes to host an application
and expose its use with a web form[1][2] – a simple way to describe a computation
request, with input ﬁelds to allow selection of dataset, parameters, response
format, etc., and an output data product returned, for example, as a URL. The
developer wants simplicity and transparency: a simple tool to do a simple job.
Once the web-form approach shows the service to be useful to a community, there
is generally a need to progress to a script-based scheme, or to have the service
functions embedded in a familiar data-analysis environment. The gateway is thus
utilized in several diﬀerent ways:
– Web form: the user can use the service in a documented environment opti-
mized for teaching the why and how of the computation that the gateway
oﬀers. This interface is also excellent for determining the health and “heart-
beat” service status.
– Data Analysis Environment: here the user executes a familiar data analy-
sis program such as ROOT[8], VOStatistics[9], IDL[10], or IRAF[11]. The
scientist can concetrate on the scientiﬁc goals, rather than the computation
logistics. The Science Gateway service is abstracted as a remote computation
service, and appears to the scientist just as any other service, except that
the considerable potential power of the Grid is employed to execute that
service. For weakly authenticated users, only a subset of predeﬁned service
commands are allowed, making execution of arbitrary code impossible.
– Programming interface (API): the scientist uses an interface written in a
high level language that uses the standard web-service protocols (SOAP,
XML-RPC) to access the service. In the case of SOAP automatic generation
of the interface stubs can be foreseen thanks to the use of the WSDL (Web
Services Description Language) as a service descriptor. The connection of
the Data Analysis Environment (mentioned in the previous bullet) can be
made using this API.
– Logging in to the Grid itself: the scientist who is a “power user” can log in to
the host node of the Science Gateway and run a chosen application directly
from the command line. This is the traditional way of using a centralised
computing facility, and it requires the highest form of authentication due to
its wide scope.
1.1 Graduated Security and HotGrid
The HotGrid scheme aims to make the Grid easy to use, yet powerful. This is
achieved by gradating access semantics starting from the level of anonymous
user, who can obtain a small allocation of CPU time, to the power user, who can
be allocated a large quantity of resources, but who is required to write a resource
allocation proposal to a committee, wait for reviews to be obtained, and ﬁnally
to obtain authentication clearance.
There is a crucial diﬀerence between two kinds of authentication: the power to
use a lot of computer resources, and the power to run arbitrary code. The former
would, for example, allow a malicious person to execute an excessive number of
tasks in the Grid. At worse, this would constitute a “denial of service” activity,
which an operator or alert user would notice and have stopped.
In contrast, a malicious person able to run arbitrary code can do very serious
damage very quickly, for example by deleting ﬁles, spooﬁng, and expanding their
authentication and credentials to gain elevated access in the system and other
mutually trusted systems.
Thus the HotGrid scheme is focused on allowing weakly authenticated users
the ability to use powerful resources, but not allowing the execution of arbitrary
code.
1.2 Levels of Authentication
The following list illustrates the graduation from none, through weak and then
to strong authentication:
– A Science Gateway service runs a speciﬁc code with parameters that control
it. The service is exposed via a web form that allows a small job to be
executed anonymously and easily. The user might be allocated one CPU-
hour in any 24-hour period.
– At the next level is the HotGrid certiﬁcate. The user completes a form spec-
ifying who they are and what they want to do, and obtains a certiﬁcate that
allows perhaps 30 CPU-hours to be expended on jobs submitted via the Sci-
ence Gateway. When the HotGrid certiﬁcate expires, the user must ﬁll out
the form again to obtain a new HotGrid certiﬁcate. (The analogy is ﬁlling
in a form to get a hotmail.com account.)
– If the user needs more resources, a strong certiﬁcate must be obtained, from a
certiﬁcate authority that makes proper checks on the user’s claimed identity
(eg. DOE, NASA, TeraGrid, Verisign etc.). The user will then attach that
strong certiﬁcate to the HotGrid form submission, and thereby obtain more
resources according to grant allocation policies, perhaps 100 CPU-hours in
any given month.
– Finally, the user may apply for Grid resources in the usual way, via a proposal
submitted for review (for TeraGrid accounts, see [12]) and then be allocated
a power-user account, with the associated right to use, say, 1000s of CPU-
hours per month. The user may also continue to use the Science Gateway,
or can log in with ssh and use traditional job submission techniques.
Currently, most Grid projects recognize only the power user. Some projects are
beginning to create anonymous gateways on non-Grid resources. We propose to
work with TeraGrid management to interpolate between these with the inter-
mediate levels in the list above, including the HotGrid level.
Initially, we will focus on two scientiﬁc application areas, high energy physics
(HEP) and virtual astronomy. The communities and scientists involved in these
ﬁelds are distributed across the nation and around the world. Both groups
already have substantial TeraGrid allocations and are planning additional re-
quests. Based on experience with HEP and virtual astronomy, we will widen the
scope of our work to support other scientiﬁc disciplines.
1.3 Certificate Authentication
A certiﬁcate is a means of authentication, meaning that when it is properly
presented, it can prove that the presenting entity is who it says it is. Certiﬁcates
can be used by computers to prove their identity (“Yes this really is caltech.edu,
not a spoof”), but in this paper we shall think of the certiﬁcate as authenticating
a human. Note that a certiﬁcate does not specify an account or allocation of any
kind of resources, but rather it is used to prove identity, so that resources owned
by the owner or group of owners can be utilized. A certiﬁcate generally has a
start and an end (or revocation) date, and becomes invalid after the end date.
The X.509 certiﬁcate is a digital document; when combined with a secret
passphrase and presented to a server, it provides proof that the correct secret
phrase was typed. This happens without the passphrase being stored or trans-
mitted on an open connection, so it is very diﬃcult to steal passphrases from a
remote location. Of course it is possible that the passphrase has been compro-
mised; perhaps the owner told a colleague, or there was spyware on a machine,
or a camera watched keystrokes. If not compromised, however, then presentation
of the certiﬁcate is strong evidence that the person presenting is the same as the
person who thought of the passphrase. Therefore, the requirement for authenti-
cation is to make sure that a person asking for a certiﬁcate to be issued is who
they say they are: this is the responsibility of a Certiﬁcate Authority (CA).
A strong CA will only issue a certiﬁcate when appropriate proof of identity is
presented: passport, driver’s licence, or referral by a trusted third party. We can
imagine a weak CA that issues certiﬁcates with little proof. Examples abound
in real life: a passport is a strong form of identiﬁcation since it is hard to obtain
without strong personal credentials and eﬀort, whereas a membership card at
a public library is rather easy to obtain. There is a compromise between the
strength of the certiﬁcate and the diﬃculty of obtaining it. Generally, a weak
certiﬁcate can only be used in a restricted context: a fake library card can only
allow an imposter to steal a few books, whereas a fake passport can be used to
build a whole new life.
It is easy to set up a CA and issue certiﬁcates. So, those who accept cer-
tiﬁcates always have a list of CAs that they trust, and any new or previously
unknown CA must convince a resource provider to accept their certiﬁcates, oth-
erwise they are of no use to the certﬁcates’ owners. Part of the diﬃculty of using
the major Grid systems (e.g. the US TeraGrid, the European Grid, the UK
eScience Grid) is the burdensome procedure of obtaining a suﬃciently strong
certiﬁcate that is accepted by the system.
However, we hope to convince the administrators of these major Grids to
accept a certain class of weak certiﬁcate: the HotGrid certiﬁcates. These will be
obtainable quickly, simply by completing a form at a special HotGrid CA web
site, with name and address and a short abstract or description of the intended
purpose of the Grid work planned. Techniques for proving that a human is ﬁlling
in the form, rather than a bot, will be employed. The HotGrid certiﬁcate will
be issued immediately, but its use will be restricted to a particular time period,
or for executing a restricted set of tasks, and/or for using a limited amount of
resources.
1.4 User Experience
Our target user in the HotGrid project is the domain scientist who knows no more
about the Grid than the rhetoric from the colour supplements. This person is not
interested in downloading and installing software, nor in writing a proposal. This
person is primarily interested in using the power of the Grid to solve a scientiﬁc
problem. We assume that they have a web browser, an internet connection, and
some time to work on the problem.
The user can simply connect to a web server that runs a science gateway,
such as those in the examples below. We expect each gateway to oﬀer minimal
functionality to the anonymous user, which will allow our user to try the system
and become convinced that a little more eﬀort is worthwhile.
At this point, our user will be directed to a CA, and asked to ﬁll out a form
with their name, location, and a chosen passphrase. They will also be asked to
specify which science gateway they wish to use, and for a short explanation of
the envisaged purpose. In the same way as the hotmail.com system allocates
free email accounts, the HotGrid system will prevent a “bot” from obtaining
HotGrid certiﬁcates automatically by use of techniques that can diﬀerentiate
human-based form entries from from computer-generated entries (see Fig. 1).
The CA will create an authentication certiﬁcate for the user in response to a
Fig. 1. An example of a CAPTCHA image (Completely Automated Public Turing
test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) that can be used to ensure that HotGrid
certiﬁcates cannot be obtained automatically.
successful form submission. This will be returned to the user and also installed
on the science gateway. We note that this certiﬁcate is very weak authentication
– in fact all it shows is that a human ﬁlled in the form, but we also note that
an advantage to the procedure is that domain scientists learn what a certiﬁcate
is and how it works. Armed with the certiﬁcate, our user can now install it in
a web browser (online help is provided by all the popular web browsers for this
simple task)
With the HotGrid certiﬁcate in the browser, the user can now enjoy access to
more Grid resources via the science gateway. The certiﬁcate is restricted by time
and named gateway. If the user wishes to make more extensive use of the science
gateway, it can be done by obtaining a better, longer-lasting certiﬁcate, perhaps
through referral by a colleague, by membership in a professional organization,
or by providing stronger proof of identity. The user may also choose to obtain a
power-user account on the Grid system by writing a proposal or by joining an
existing trusted project.
Thus, by the use of the HotGrid scheme, we hope to engage and empower a
much wider community of domain scientists in Grid-based scientiﬁc computing
than would otherwise be expected.
2 Clarens
Clarens[13] is a Grid-enabled web services framework that provides a secure,
high-performance foundation for constructing web services. It accepts web ser-
vice requests from clients formatted as SOAP or XML-RPC messages, processes
these requests, and returns responses in the same message format.
Clients range from web browsers, through simple scripts, up to large compiled
applications. A minimum of software environment requirements are imposed on
these clients. Clarens provides a standard application programming interface
(API) that is independent of transport protocol or message format.
Two server implementations are currently provided: one using the well-known
Apache web server with an embedded Python interpreter, and the other in Java
with the Apache Tomcat servlet container. Clarens is agnostic towards operat-
ing systems: both Unix and Windows are supported. A set of standard services
are available to clients. These include authentication, ﬁle access, shell command
execution and tools for administration of security. Users with recognized certiﬁ-
cates can be organized in a rich hierarchical structure of groups and sub-groups,
and thus into virtual organizations (VO).
2.1 Clarens security
Clients are authenticated using standard X.509 certiﬁcates, using SSL encryp-
tion, as used by web browsers when communicating with e.g. banking web sites.
As an additional precaution clients can also be authenticated using so-called
proxy, or temporary, certiﬁcates that are valid for a limited period of time, but
which still provide cryptographically secure user authentication. These proxy
certiﬁcates can be generated on the client computer or by making use of an
intermediate proxy server that uses a username and password combination for
authentication. Once a client is authenticated, Clarens provides access to ser-
vices, reﬁned by the use of using access control lists (ACLs) for individuals or
groups of individuals to each service (e.g. task submission, access to ﬁles, per-
mission to modify group deﬁnitions, etc.).
Clients are tracked in a session database that stores the certiﬁcate details and
is able to provide complete session logging for security and debugging purposes.
The database is also used by the server to enforce certiﬁcate time limits. Other
resource limits can be enforced e.g. CPU time, disk usage and network bandwidth
usage.
Fig. 2. Two methods of authentication: a) a temporary (proxy) certiﬁcate is created
on the client machine and presented to Grid services for authentication. b) A proxy
service is contacted using a username and password, and a temporary certiﬁcate is
returned to the client machine. This temporary certiﬁcate can be presented to Grid
services for authentication as usual.
3 Building a Science Gateway
Increased computer security is always a compromise with ease-of-use. The agree-
ment on reasonable levels of security is generally achieved by balancing these
opposing requirements. In conventional use of computer centers, there are two
main roles: the User and the Administrator. In contrast, when designing and
building a science gateway, there are three roles:
– User: this is the person who uses the Gateway, and may be a skilled pro-
fessional scientist, a schoolchild or anyone with intermediate expertise. This
person may be an anonymous user, weakly authenticated or may be a strongly
authenticated “power user”. It is important to make sure that the former
cannot run arbitrary code on the center’s computers; and it is just as im-
portant not to overly restrict those who have gone to the eﬀort of obtaining
a high level of certiﬁcation.
– Administrator: this person decides on certiﬁcate policies, audits code (or
trusts the Gateway Developer, see below), and deploys the relevant services
so they are accessible and reliable. Furthermore, the Administrator makes
sure the Gateway resides in a sandbox, meaning that even if the Gateway
Developer supplies insecure software, then the damage is limited.
– Gateway Developer: this person (or group of people) has the scientiﬁc domain
knowledge (what is being computed and why), and also the programming
skill to connect domain-speciﬁc code into the execution sandbox, and to
decide appropriate levels of resource consumption. The Gateway Developer
has the responsibility for limiting what the Users can do, and in particular
for ensuring that anonymous or HotGrid Users cannot run arbitrary code.
The Administrator can build a sandbox for the gateway by keeping it within a
restricted environment using the well-known method of partitioning a so-called
chroot jail, meaning that only ﬁles within the sandbox can be read, written,
or executed. The Developer, in turn, should ensure that clients with weak au-
thentication cannot run shell commands that are not explicitly allowed for the
purposes of the science domain. The examples in section 4 illustrate these points
in the context of real examples.
3.1 Accounting
We have described how a user with weak authentication can be allowed to use
the power of a computer center, but without being given the power to run a
command that may compromise system integrity. However, the user needs to
be restricted further in the sense of resource usage. We do not want a weakly
authenticated HotGrid user submitting a thousand jobs to a queue and block
the queue with running jobs for weeks.
We envisage HotGrid users obtaining a certiﬁcate that has a near revocation
date, perhaps one or two days in the future. This will prevent any use of the
gateway after that time. Indeed, the user will be unable to access any information
about sessions that were started with that certiﬁcate.
When a HotGrid certiﬁcate is presented, it will be mapped to a generic
account name that for all HotGrid users of a particular gateway. These accounts
will have an associated responsible “power user”, who would generally be the
gateway developer. The usage for these accounts will thus be an aggregate of all
HotGrid usage.
Usage could also be restricted in a very application-speciﬁc fashion. As an
example, an astronomical image mosaicker would not allow HotGrid users to
create a mosaic larger than a given size. An HEP Monte Carlo event simulator
would not allow more than a certain number of events to be generated.
4 Examples
4.1 Astronomical Image Processing
The objective here is a mosaic of astronomical images[14]; an example is in
prototype on the Caltech TeraGrid, using the Atlasmaker[15] software. The user
provides a string that is the name of an astronomical object or coordinates in
the sky, that will be the center of the requested image, together with an angular
size of the request. These parameters can be provided by web form or by client
API, which sends the request via XML-RPC to the gateway. The user receives
by immediate return a monitoring URL that contains the random sessionID.
The user can then probe the progress of the of the job through this URL and
collect results when the job is ﬁnished.
4.2 Monte-Carlo Processing and HEP
Another prototype is a science gateway that allows anonymous and HotGrid
users to submit Monte-Carlo jobs that simulate proton-proton collisions in the
CERN CMS (Compact Muon Solenoid) detector. Typically, a particular event
topology, and a statistically signiﬁcant number of events are required. The Monte
Carlo is a standard piece of the CMS experiment’s software stack, and ideally
suited to encapsulation as a gateway service. A form would be completed spec-
ifying the desired Monte Carlo generation parameters and number of events.
The gateway would take care of parcelling the request into units that could be
individually and independently executed on a cluster of computers running e.g.
Condor[18], and aggregating the results datasets into a complete ﬁle which could
then be downloaded by the user.
4.3 VOStatistics and IRAF
The VOStatistics gateway has been built by the NSF GRIST project[17], based
on a web service framework developed previously[9]. It provides the client with
access to a remote session of the “R” software, which provides powerful statistics
and data mining capability. Similarly, the astronomical data processing package
IRAF[11] is being made available by the US National Virtual Observatory[16]
as a remote service package.
In each of these cases, the user enters a script that is executed by the server,
perhaps processing thousands of ﬁles. There is, however, a potential danger,
because these powerful environments all oﬀer a shell escape command. Therefore
we must be careful that we are not providing the ability to execute arbitrary
shell commands – by means of restricted shells on the server, as discussed above.
The utility of the remote execution is obtained because the remote machine
can be much more powerful than the user’s workstation, perhaps because it
holds a large archive or runs on a multi-processor machine. However, eﬀectively
utilizing R or IRAF on a distributed-memory cluster is still a research eﬀort.
4.4 Grid Enabled Analysis of HEP events
The ROOT software is widely used in HEP for the analysis of particle physics
data. Akin to tools like Mathematica and Matlab, ROOT oﬀers a rich suite of
integrated tools for histogramming, ﬁtting, rendering, annotating and otherwise
processing scientiﬁc data. While ROOT is commonly run on a user’s desktop or
laptop, a ROOT server and slave system is available, called PROOF, that allows
the event processing to be carried out in parallel on a set of worker computers
that are coordinated by a master computer.
The PROOF system is an ideal conﬁguration for an implementation of a
HotGrid-based service along the lines described in this paper. A ROOT user,
running on a resource-limited desktop system, and thus unable to analyse a
suﬃcient number of events to achieve a statistically signiﬁcant result, obtains
a HotGrid certiﬁcate. With the certiﬁcate, she authenticates with a Clarens
TeraGrid service oﬀering the PROOF system, which then allows her to bring
to bear the full power of a PROOF cluster of one hundred TeraGrid CPUs.
Moreover, she never needs to leave the ROOT environment: all the dataset I/O
and processing are handled in a transparent way, and the impression is simply
that her desktop system has suddenly increased in power by at least two orders
of magnitude.
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